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1.  Introduction
This paper is an extended meditation on issues raised in Dayal’s (1997) paper on
the role of the morpheme –ever in free relatives (FRs) as in this example:
(1)  There’s a lot of garlic in whatever (it is that) Arlo is cooking.
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(2)  There’s a lot of garlic in what Arlo is cooking.
(3)  There’s a lot of violence in whatever Parker writes.
Our immediate intuition about (1) is that –ever indicates speaker’s ignorance. We
hear the speaker as signaling that she doesn’t know what Arlo is cooking, while at
the same time asserting that no matter what Arlo is cooking, there’s a lot of garlic
in it. The FR without –ever in (2) carries no such signal of ignorance.
The task before us is to make precise the nature of the contribution of
–ever in (1). If at all possible, we would like to relate this use of FRs with –ever to
the one in (3), which seems to call for a treatment of whatever as a universal
quantifier of some sort.
Let’s  look  at  one  recent  characterization  of  the  speaker’s  ignorance
reading of whatever: “In the speaker’s ignorance reading, whatever quantifies
over epistemic worlds. So in a sentence like Whatever I cooked is green on the
reading ‘Whatever it is that I cooked, it is green’, whatever quantifies over
epistemically accessible worlds in which I cooked something. Such worlds will
include this thing being green and a tomato, it being green and a potato, and so
on” (Iatridou and Varlokosta, 1998). The obvious idea then appears to be to treat
whatever as introducing universal quantification over epistemic alternatives. We
would give (1) a paraphrase like “In all epistemically accessible worlds, there’s a
lot of garlic in the thing that Arlo is cooking”.2
Dayal presents an analysis precisely along these lines. The technical
aspects of her proposal are as follows:
(4)  Analysis D  (Dayal’s Implementation)
a. whateverj [… tj …]IP denotes at w =
λQ ∀ i-alternatives ∈ f(w)(s) [Q(i)(ιx[P(i)(x)]]
where P is the property derived by abstracting over xj in the IP
denotation.
b. f(w)(s) = {w’: ∀p [s believes p(w) → p(w’)}
for a world of evaluation w and speaker s, f(w)(s) is the set of worlds
in which the speaker’s beliefs about w hold.
c. a world w’ ∈ f(w)(s) is an i-alternative iff
there exists some w” ∈ f(w)(s) such that ιx [P(w’)(x)] ≠ ιx [P(w”)(x)].
Following earlier work by Jacobson (1995), Dayal (1995), and Rullmann (1995),
this proposal starts with the idea that FRs are definite descriptions (what Arlo is
cooking = the thing that Arlo is cooking). On top of that, whatever introduces a
layer of epistemic quantification, which necessitates giving whatever-FRs a
quantificational  type.  In  essence,  whatever  asserts  that  in  each  epistemic
alternative, the sentence without –ever is true. However, instead of simply
quantifying over epistemically accessible worlds, Dayal employs the new concept
of  i-alternatives.  In  her  prose,  she  gives  the  following  characterization:  i-
alternatives “can differ from the actual world only in the denotation of the FR”
and “the notion of i-alternatives […] characterizes a world as an alternative iff it
can be distinguished from another world solely on the basis of the denotation of
the FR”.
But note that the formal definition in (4) does not really capture the
desired intuition. Nothing in it ensures that i-alternatives only differ in the
denotation of the FR. In fact, the set of i-alternatives will be identical to the entire
set of epistemic alternatives (which can differ wildly depending on the extent of
ignorance present) as soon as there are two epistemically accessible worlds that
differ in the denotation of the FR. If there is no such variation among the
epistemically accessible worlds, then there are no i-alternatives.
Dayal recognizes the latter case. She says that “if the speaker has a belief
about the identity of the unique relevant individual, there cannot be two worlds in
f(w)(s) that will qualify as i-alternatives. The ever FR will be infelicitous because3
quantification will be over an empty domain”. From this, we might conclude that
Dayal imputes a presupposition to whatever-FRs that the domain of alternatives is
non-empty. Later in the paper, when she turns to NPI-licensing in FRs, she seems
to have a different view: “[g]iven a degenerate domain of quantification [… the
FR sentence] will come out vacuously true”.
I  propose  to  reformulate  Dayal’s  analysis  by  explicitly  assuming  a
presupposition of uncertainty and by dispensing with the intermediary concept of
i–alternative.
(5)  Analysis D’  (A reformulation of Dayal’s Implementation)
whatever (w) (F) (P) (Q)
a. presupposes:    ∃w',w" ∈ F: ιx. P w' x ≠ι x. P w" x
b. asserts:    ∀w' ∈ F: Q w' ιx. P w' x
Here, F is the modal base for whatever, a set of worlds (in the simple case the set
of epistemically accessible worlds of the speaker of the sentence) with respect to
which a presupposition of variation and an assertion of epistemic necessity are
formulated. In words: whatever-statements presuppose that the speaker cannot
identify the referent of the free relative and assert that the referent – whatever it
is – has the matrix property in all of the speaker’s doxastic/epistemic alternatives.
Our example in (1) will receive a logical form like this:
(6)     λw. whatever w fw s λw. λx. Arlo is cooking x in w
λw. λx. there's a lot of garlic in x in w
The sentence presupposes that there are two worlds in f(w)(s) which differ in
what Arlo is cooking and asserts that in all the worlds in f(w)(s), there’s a lot of
garlic in what Arlo is cooking.
Before we move on, let me present a curiosity:
(7)  There’s a lot of garlic in whatever it is that I am cooking.
As before, there is a speaker ignorance reading: perhaps I don’t know what I am
cooking because I am rather blindly following some set of instructions. What is
interesting is that in addition, there is a hearer’s ignorance reading. The sentence
could be used when I fully know what I am cooking but am deliberately keeping
it a secret from you. You can almost hear the teasing tone with which this could4
be said. What this example indicates is that the modal base with respect to which
the  contribution  of –ever is formulated does not have to be the speaker’s
epistemic alternatives, but can take on other flavors.
We will now consider two variations on Analysis D/D’, one of which
further develops the idea of presupposed variation in the denotation of the FR,
while the other comes closer to Dayal’s informal intuition of i-alternatives as
differing minimally from each other in the denotation of the FR.
2.  Ignorance (Analysis N)
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The modification we undertake in this section is motivated by worries about
whether whatever truly introduces an assertion that universally quantifies over
epistemic alternatives. One odd prediction of Analysis D/D’ is that (1) would be
false in a scenario where there is in fact a lot of garlic in what Arlo is cooking but
where the speaker is actually uncertain about whether that is so. Our intuition
seems to be rather that the sentence would be true in such a case (although we
might judge the speaker to have merely lucked onto the truth). In response one
might say that this concern arises in all kinds of epistemic statements, not just
with whatever-FRs. What after all is the truth-value judgment when a speaker
asserts it must be raining in a situation where it is in fact raining but does so on
completely inconclusive evidence? The issue is far from settled in general, it
appears to me, so we might want to steer clear of it.
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A more troubling issue is that Analysis D/D’ makes clearly incorrect
predictions for embedded occurrences of whatever-FRs:
(8)  Unless there’s a lot of garlic in whatever Arlo is cooking, I will eat out
tonight. [≠ Unless I’m sure that there’s a lot of garlic in what Arlo is
cooking, I will eat out tonight.]
(9)  I suspect that there’s a lot of garlic in whatever Arlo is cooking. [≠ I
suspect that I’m sure that …]
(10)  When Emma finds whatever she is looking for, she certainly won’t tell
me. [≠ When I’m sure that Emma finds/has found what she is looking for,
she certainly won’t tell me.]
As indicated, in none of these cases do we perceive an embedded contribution of
epistemic certainty to the assertion of the sentence. Furthermore, in all three
cases, it appears that the presupposition of speaker ignorance as to the denotation5
of the FR projects (as expected) to the matrix level. That is, all three examples
signal that the speaker doesn’t know the denotation of the FR, but in none of the
examples is there an embedded epistemic assertion. This contrasts quite sharply
with what happens when we embed an epistemic must:
(11)  ??Unless it must be raining, I will go out tonight.
One obvious difference is that epistemic must resists embedding in the first place
while the allegedly epistemic whatever does not. And but once we think about
what (11) would mean, it seems that we would have an embedded epistemic
assertion: Unless I’m certain that it is raining, I will go out tonight.
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Let us therefore modify the analysis so that whatever does not make an
epistemic assertion at all. We continue to have a presupposition of variation of the
FR-denotation across the modal base, but combine this with a simple definite
description denotation for the FR. This also allows us to give whatever a simpler
type than before:
(12)  Analysis N
whatever (w) (F) (P)
a. presupposes:    ∃w',w" ∈ F: ιx. P w' x ≠ι x. P w" x
b. denotes:    ιx. P w x
In  a  simple  example  such  as  our  (1),  the whatever-FR now introduces the
presupposition that among the worlds in the modal base supplied by context (in
the normal case, the speaker’s epistemic alternatives) there is variation as to what
Arlo is cooking – that is, it is presupposed that the speaker doesn’t know what
Arlo is cooking. But on the level of asserted content, the whatever-FR  is
equivalent to a simple FR – it denotes the thing Arlo is cooking.
In  embedded  contexts,  the  presupposition  of  variation/ignorance  is
projected according to the usual principles of presupposition projection. So, in
example (8), the speaker’s ignorance becomes a presupposition of the entire
sentence. The example thus presupposes that the speaker doesn’t know what Arlo
is cooking and asserts that unless there’s a lot of garlic in what Arlo is cooking,
the speaker will eat out. This is the correct meaning, so Analysis N has a
significant  advantage over Analysis D/D’.6
When whatever-FRs occur in the complement to an attitude verb, a further
possibility arises:
(13)  Pascal correctly suspected that whatever he was eating was not vegetarian.
Note that (13) can be read as involving uncertainty/ignorance on the part of
Pascal, the subject of the attitude ascription, and not necessarily on the part of the
speaker (as strongly suggested by the use of the adverb correctly). This subject-
oriented reading of whatever is fully compatible with Analysis N. All that is
needed is to allow the option of tying the modal base of whatever to the subject of
the matrix predicate. Here is a logical form that indicates this:
(14)     λw. Pascal suspected in w that
λw'. whatever w' fw p λw". λy. p is eating y in w"
is not vegetarian in w'
This kind of structure is also possible with a quantified subject:
(15)  Every one of the contestants suspected that whatever (it was that) he was
eating was not vegetarian.
(16)     λw. every λx. x is a contestant in w
λx. x suspected in w that
λw'. whatever w' fw x λw". λy. x is eating y in w"
is not vegetarian in w'
Analysis N works just fine for (15). According to generally assumed principles of
presupposition projection, there will be a presupposition that each contestant did
not know what he was eating. There is no embedded modal assertion. Each
contestant simply suspected that what he was eating was not vegetarian.
I conclude this section by claiming that Analysis N is a conservative
modification of Dayal’s formal system and captures successfully a number of
examples that her proposal could not account for. In the next section, we will
encounter examples that seem to urge a different approach.7
3.  Indifference (Analysis I)
Consider the following examples:
(17)  I grabbed whatever tool was handy.
(18)  Zack simply voted for whoever was at the top of the ballot.
In both examples, the preferred reading does not signal speaker’s ignorance.
Instead, a kind of indifference on the part of an agent is conveyed. I grabbed the
tool that was handy and I didn’t care what tool it was (even though I probably
knew what it was). Zack indiscriminately voted for the person at the top of the
ballot.
We might try to subsume this indifference reading under Analysis N. Why
not say that in these cases the modal base that whatever  works with is not
anyone’s epistemic state but instead an agent’s deontic alternatives? Then, the
presupposition of variation would amount to saying that at least two different
referents for the FR are compatible with the agent’s preferences. If this approach
could be maintained, it would make for a very pleasing story. The various uses of
whatever would simply be the product of the context-dependency of modal
expressions as analyzed in Kratzer’s well-known system (e.g. Kratzer, 1991). Just
like the modal auxiliary must can take on epistemic readings and deontic readings,
depending on what kind of modal base the context supplies, whatever would take
on  speaker  ignorance,  subject  ignorance,  or  subject  indifference  readings
depending on the modal base supplied.
Unfortunately, Analysis N does not correctly capture the meaning of
indifference uses of whatever. Consider (17): What we would predict is that (17)
presupposes that there are at least two worlds compatible with my preferences that
differ as to which tool was handy. First of all, that doesn’t really say that I didn’t
care which tool was handy. All it requires is that my preferences are not so
particular that there aren’t two different tools that would satisfy them. I may in
fact have cared very much which tool was handy: it had to be either my favorite
hammer or the new wrench I bought last weekend. That doesn’t seem right: (17)
conveys a much stronger sense of indifference. And the same goes for (18). If
George W. Bush, Al Gore, and Ralph Nader are candidates who may well be at
the top of the ballot, the sentence is not in fact compatible with Zack strongly
wanting either Bush or Gore (but definitely not Nader) to be at the top.
Furthermore, the indifference that whatever conveys in these examples is
not just stronger than what the analysis would predict, it is also not quite directed
at the referent of the FR. Consider (18): the meaning we perceive is not merely8
that Zack didn’t care who was at the top of the ballot and voted for the person that
was in fact at the top. What we hear is that Zack didn’t care who he voted for and
that he made his decision based on the criterion of who was at the top of the
ballot. This meaning is not at all captured by applying Analysis N with a deontic
modal base. As a final nail in the coffin, consider this additional example:
(19)  I had no time to play around, so I grudgingly used whatever email
program was installed on the computer.
This sentence clearly suggests that the speaker did have preferences as to what
email program should have been installed on the computer. Nevertheless, the
example has the flavor of an indifference use of whatever.
Let me suggest that we should try to derive paraphrases of our examples
that look like these:
(20)  a. I grabbed the tool that was handy, and if a different tool had been
handy, I would have grabbed that.
b. Zack voted for the person that was at the top of the ballot, and if a
different person had been at the top of the ballot, Zack would have
voted  for that person.
c. I used the email program that was installed on the computer, and if a
different email program had been installed, I would have used that
one.
In essence, the idea is that whatever has a conditional semantics: instead of
presupposing variation/ignorance, it presupposes indifference in the sense that a
minimal change in the identity of the FR referent would not make a difference to
the truth of the sentence. Here is a concrete statement of the new Analysis I:
(21)  Analysis I  (i-indifference)
whatever (w) (F) (P) (Q)
a. presupposes:    ∀w' ∈ minw F ∩λ w'. ιx. P w' x ≠ι x. P w x :
Qw ' ιx. P w' x =Qw ιx. P w x
b. asserts:    Qw ιx. P w x
As before the assertion of a whatever-FR will be identical to the one of an FR
without –ever. But the presupposition it introduces is quite different from the one9
we had in Analyses D/D' and N. What is presupposed is what I would like to call
i-indifference: all of the worlds in the modal base F that are minimally different
from w but where the referent of the FR is different from that in w are such that
the truth of the whole sentence that whatever operates on is still the same as in w.
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If we assume that the min-operator employed here itself triggers an existential
presupposition, that is, that it presupposes that there are worlds in its argument,
we derive as a corollary a presupposition of variation.
Let us experiment and apply this analysis to Zack. Here is the logical form we
need:
(22)     λw. whoever w fw s λw'. λx. x is at the top of the ballot in w'
λw'. λx. Zack votes for x in w'
We now compute presupposition and assertion:
(23)  Assertion:  In w, Zack votes for the person at the top of the ballot in
w.
Presupposition:  In all worlds w' minimally different from w in which
  someone different is at the top of the ballot, Zack votes
  for that person iff in w he votes for the person at the top 
of the ballot in w.
The quantification is over counterfactual alternatives which differ from the actual
world in who is at the top of the ballot but which agree with it in Zack’s
tendencies, specifically his basis for deciding who he votes for.
At this point, I conclude that Analysis I deals satisfactorily with our
indifference examples. Further, it seems to come quite close to what may have
lain behind Dayal's original idea of i-alternatives. The whatever-FRs say that in
worlds that differ "only" in the identity of the FR referent, the truth of the
sentence is still the same. But instead of postulating that we can construct such
worlds, we rely on the independently given semantics for conditionals.
4.  Unification?
What is disconcerting, however, is that we now have two analyses tailor-made for
two different kinds of examples. Analysis N works like a charm for ignorance
uses of whatever and Analysis I deals beautifully with indifference uses. Wouldn't
it be nice if we could simplify the story? We already saw that Analysis N is not10
well suited to deal with indifference examples. So, perhaps Analysis I can be
tweaked to account for ignorance examples? Let us see what Analysis I would say
about our initial example:
(24)  There’s a lot of garlic in whatever (it is that) Arlo is cooking.
Assertion: There's a lot of garlic in the thing Arlo is cooking.
Presupposition: In all of the minimally different F-worlds where Arlo is
  cooking something different from what he is actually
  cooking, there's the same amount of garlic in what he is
  cooking.
This will in fact work quite well if we are assuming that the modal base F here
can be identified with the epistemic alternatives of the speaker. If we do that, what
is presupposed is that across the epistemic state of the speaker the amount of
garlic in the dish is indifferent to the identity of the dish Arlo is cooking. Further,
since we can assume an existential presupposition for the conditional operator, it
is presupposed that the speaker's epistemic state shows variation as to what Arlo
is cooking.
In other words, something very close to Analysis N comes out of a special
case of Analysis I. Ignorance uses of whatever arise out of giving the conditional
hidden in the meaning of whatever an epistemic modal base. Our paradigm
indifference uses arise out of a counterfactual modal base. That's quite pretty and
related on a grander scale to similar hopes of giving a context-dependent unified
semantics for epistemic and counterfactual conditionals.
There are some other cases where the analyses seem to converge quite
nicely:
(25)  Pick whatever apple you want.
The use of whatever in such “free choice” imperatives is of course well-known.
Both of our analyses would derive reasonable interpretations, it appears. Analysis
N or the epistemic resolution of Analysis I would derive a presupposition of
ignorance: the speaker doesn’t know which apple the hearer wants. When added
to the ordinary meaning of the permission imperative whose import is that the
hearer may pick the apple s/he wants, this presupposition would naturally enhance
the impression that the speaker is giving the hearer a free hand. If the speaker
doesn’t know which apple the hearer wants but permits her/him to pick the one
s/he wants, the permission must be a very liberal one.11
The counterfactual/indifference resolution of Analysis I might also give a
reasonable interpretation. The idea would be that the speaker gives the hearer
permission to pick the apple s/he wants with the presupposition that the speaker
would do the same if the hearer wanted a different apple than the one s/he actually
wants.
Unfortunately, I have to rain on our parade by introducing this stubborn
old friend:
(26)  Unless there’s a lot of garlic in whatever Arlo is cooking, I will eat out
tonight.
Out of an epistemic resolution of Analysis I, we would derive roughly the
following  presupposition:  the  speaker's  epistemic  state  is  such  that  in  all
accessible worlds what Arlo is cooking (and he cooks different things across these
worlds) has the same amount of garlic in it. That is devastatingly wrong. The
sentence in fact makes it clear that the speaker doesn't know how much garlic is in
what Arlo is cooking. Our project of unification appears doomed.
Here's an idea which may be too desperate to be correct. When we give
whatever widest scope in this example, we get something that comes much closer
to being right. The presupposition would essentially be that across the epistemic
space of the speaker no matter what Arlo is cooking, the connection between the
amount of garlic in it and my going out stays the same. And as before, the
existential presupposition of the conditional operator ensures that the speaker
doesn't know what Arlo is cooking. That's good, but it comes at a price. We need
to give the whatever-FR scope outside the unless-clause, which is a strong island
for all kinds of overt and covert extraction and scope mechanisms. I don't know
whether this is too high a price to pay. Special scope possibilities are under
current discussion for a number of constructions. One perhaps quite close parallel
might be the claim that for computing the presupposition triggered by even, we
sometimes need to give it wide scope out of scope islands (Wilkinson, 1993).
Another possible problem with Analysis I surfaces when we try to see
what happens when an indifference FR appears in an embedded context. An
obvious example to consider would be something like this:
(27)  Unless Zack simply voted for whoever was at the top of the ballot, he
must have spend at least 5 minutes in the voting booth.
My impression is that this example has a (preferred) reading that goes counter to
the idea we have pursued so far, that whatever is a presuppositional operator only.
What we observed with speaker ignorance was that it projects out of embedded12
contexts. But in (27), Zack’s indifference seems to enter the truth-conditions at
the embedded level. The sentence is read as meaning “Unless Zack indifferently
voted for the person at the top of the ballot, he must have …”. So, there appears to
be a big difference between ignorance and indifference uses as far as their
behavior in embedded contexts is concerned. Perhaps, we should relate the
possibility illustrated in (27) to the option of similar readings with any:
(28)  Maeve isn’t just any lawyer – she is the best in the business.
But I will leave this to others or at least to another occasion.
My preliminary conclusion is that Analysis I can capture all readings of
whatever that we have so far discussed, if (and that’s a pretty big if) one can be
comfortable with saying that (i) when its modal base is epistemic it receives
widest  scope  even  outside  scope  islands,  and  (ii)  when  its  modal  base  is
counterfactual its presuppositional content of i-indifference becomes asserted
content in embedded occurrences. If this proves too much to swallow, we are left
with an ambiguity between N-whatever and I-whatever.
5.  Extensions
As promised at the beginning, we have to explore how our analyses fare when
confronted with generalizing whatever-free relatives like this:
(29)  There’s a lot of violence in whatever Parker writes.
It seems that our example is largely synonymous with a run-of-the-mill quantified
sentence:
(30)  There’s a lot of violence in everything Parker writes.
This fact has led many people to suggest an analysis of whatever as a universal
quantifier over individuals. But then we would be left with no good uniform
analysis covering also the ignorance and indifference uses that we have been
concerned with so far.
Dayal proposes that even (29) falls under Analysis D. The idea can be
motivated by examples that involve an overt adverbial quantifier:
(31)  People usually honor whoever is elected.13
Dayal’s suggestion is that the contribution of whatever is embedded under the
adverbial quantifier here:
(32)     λw. usually λo. o is contextuallyrelevant in w
λo. people honor whoever w fo s λo. λx. x is elected in o
The adverbial usually quantifies over contextually relevant occasions and claims
that in most of those occasions people honor the person that is elected. It can be
assumed that whatever is given as its modal base the same set of occasions that
usually quantifies over, i.e. we say that f(o)(s) = the set of contextually relevant
occasions. The contribution of whatever according to Analysis D’ and Analysis N
would then be the presupposition that among this set there is variation as to who
is elected.
6 Note that with such a modal base, variation does not mean ignorance,
it simply means that different people get elected in some of the situations
quantified over. What about Analysis I? We would predict a presupposition that
in each of the relevant situations people's behavior towards the person who is
elected is indifferent to counterfactual changes.
Can this carry over to examples like (29)? The idea would be that there as
well  whatever contributes what it always contributes and that the universal
quantification is due to a silent generic operator. This is not so implausible since
we can give quite similar examples where the universal force is present even
though –ever is absent:
(33)  There's a lot of violence in what Parker writes.
(34)  There's a lot of violence in the things Parker writes.
I am, however, not quite convinced. One reason to be skeptical is that the
universal reading of (29) is actually quite fragile. It goes away when we look at
whatever-FRs with nominal heads:
(35)  ??There's a lot of violence in whatever book(s) Parker writes.
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It seems to me that only unadorned occurrences of whatever give rise to the
universal reading. Furthermore, I was told at the SALT conference that there are
languages that make even more obvious distinctions between universal whatever
and ignorance/indifference whatever, such as Hungarian which simply lacks the
latter (Anna Szabolcsi, p.c.).14
If it turns out that there is a separate item whatever which quantifies
universally over individuals, it is still possible that in addition to the universal
quantification –ever contributes a presupposition of indifference, which it would
share with the other item whatever.
6.  Conclusion
We have surveyed some occurrences and uses of whatever-FRs that go beyond
what has been discussed in the previous literature. Most of what we have
encountered can be captured by variations on Dayal's proposal. Of course, we are
left with many open questions and much discomfort about the bumpy terrain.
Whatever comes next might get us closer to a resolution.
Endnotes
1 Whenever it helps to bring out the special nature of the meaning contributed by
–ever, I will use an embedded it-cleft in the free relative. I will leave it to future
research to investigate what lies behind the effect of the it-cleft.
2 N is supposed to be somewhat mnemonic for knowledge.
3 Westmoreland (1995) argues that epistemic must is not a universal quantifier
over epistemic possibilities but functions as an evidential label separate from the
truth-conditional semantics of a sentence.
4 Note that, unlike whatever-free relatives, whatever-conditionals furiously resist
embedding: #Unless whatever Arlo is cooking, there’s a lot of garlic in it, …
5 For our purposes here, we don't need to worry about details of conditional
semantics.  I  have  chosen  a  formulation  that  is  very  close  to  the  standard
Stalnaker-Lewis  semantics  for  counterfactuals.  For  a  recent  exploration  of
variations on this theme, see von Fintel (2000).
6 The story according to Analysis D is more complicated. See Dayal’s paper for
some discussion.
7 Of course, ignorance/indifference uses of whatever perfectly well tolerate
nominal heads: There's a lot of violence in whatever book (it is that) Parker is
writing.15
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